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Mongolia, North Korea, and the New Security
Architecture in Northeast Asia
By Stephen E. Noerper, Ph.D. (USA)
The late March 2002 gathering of national leaders in Monterrey, Mexico
saw repeated emphases on the need to rectify economic disparities in the
international arena and assist the world’s poor.  Having announced a planned
increase in US overseas assistance prior to the event, US President George W.
Bush linked poverty alleviation with anti-terrorism.  The argument, as previously
articulated by US Secretary of State Colin Powell, is one where economic equity
provides hope, eliminating hotbeds of disenfranchisement and dissent.  The
elevation of economic security and new emerging threats reveals a growing
consensus toward more effectively addressing the disequalibrium associated
with globalisation.
Concurrently, the US President has couched traditional security concerns
anew, with weapons of mass destruction a primary focus.  The US State of the
Union address posited the now (in)famous “axis of evil,” comprised of North
Korea, Iran, and Iraq, as the principle offender that could afford terrorists new
and dangerous capabilities.
When scouring the Northeast Asian landscape, then, one sees a region
whose international relations—relatively unwavering this past half century—
are increasingly in flux.  The “axis” address elevated North Korea in the broader
US strategic calculus, while at the same time limiting the possibility for forward
progress in bilateral relations.  The anti-terrorism campaign has altered so-
called great power relations, seemingly bringing Moscow, Beijing, and
Washington into closer proximity, while at the same time masking real and
longer term differences.  It has also elevated the importance of smaller and
middle level powers in the strategic calculus.  And the new focus on rectifying
the negatives of globalisation suggests a need to focus on the poorer areas of
Northeast Asia—Mongolia, North Korea, and Russian Far East—to strike a
better distribution of resources and peaceful development.  A prosperous region
portends a more stabile one.
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Mongolia
Those who question the strategic relevance of Mongolia might do well to
consider the degree of global focus on Afghanistan prior to the events of Autumn
2001.  Like Afghanistan, Mongolia sits as a “straddle” country, in its case
couched between Russia and China, Northeast and Central Asia, the Islamic
and non-Islamic East.  The combined size of Britain, Germany, and France,
Mongolia is rich in natural resources, largely untapped.  With large natural
resources and ready access to Siberia, it holds importance to those looking for
energy resources for a rapidly developing Northeast Asia.  Though challenged
in its economic progress a decade after casting off its Stalinist bindings,
Mongolia is now seventy-two percent privatised—a nation on the rise, one
transforming and transformed, and one kindly disposed to Japanese, Korean,
and other economic interests.  In labelling last year the Year of Foreign
Investment, Mongolia hoped to attract new partners and new financing.
Inhibiting the reform process, however, are struggles in the political arena.
Although the former communists are again in control, the ruling Mongolian
Peoples Revolutionary Party considers itself a democratic one and harbours
both progressive and conservative elements within.  Its control of 72 of 76 par-
liamentary seats suggests to some observers stasis, but the degree of factional-
ism is on the rise.  The opposition for its part remains largely divided, although
the potential merger of opposition party elements suggests some fluidity in po-
litical restructuring.  For all its limits, the political system is one in flux, and the
evolution of party politics, institutions, and roles of the parliamentary, judicial,
and executive branches suggests an ultimate move forward on the road to de-
mocracy.  One might liken the diversity and political debate in Mongolia today
as not dissimilar to that in a newly democratised Seoul in the late 1980s.
Mongolia is on a seeming rise in the broader strategic calculus as well.
Largely forgotten in the decade since its transition to democracy, Mongolia has
emerged as a focus in Chinese and Russian discussions on Northeast and Cen-
tral Asia.  Russian President Putin visited in November 2000, signalling a grow-
ing role for Mongolia in his look eastward.  His visit followed on that of Chi-
nese, South Korean, and Japanese leaders the year prior.  Late March 2002 saw
a visit by the Russian Prime Minister to Ulan Bator.  Both Russia and China
have discussed the possible role of Mongolia in the Shanghai Cooperation Or-
ganization (SCO), the Central Asian alliance aimed at countering terrorism.  This
calculus increased in importance with growing Chinese and Russian concerns
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about longer term US involvement in Central Asia.  China, for its part, main-
tains a critical and growing economic interest in Mongolia and received
Mongolia’s Prime Minister in early January 2002 for a discussion of expanding
bilateral relations.  Chinese President Hu Jin-tao’s 2003 state visit to Mongolia
signalled further dynamism in bilateral relations.
Mongolia’s relations with China and Russia are complicated as well.  China
has largely undercut the Mongolian cashmere industry and is the source of a
large pool of illegal labour.  Mongolians also harbour a distinct distrust of China,
born of history.  Mongolians, trustful of Russia, which left infrastructure and
services after decades of presence in Mongolia, are increasingly cautious of
Russian designs.  These are most recently articulated in Russian pressures on
Mongolia over property in Ulan Bator and the outstanding debt issue.
Mongolia has actively promoted a third neighbour policy favouring
Europe, the United States, and other external actors the last half decade.  Europe
has been active in Mongolian development circles, particularly through
international organizations, Danish assistance in media and other development,
and German development and interparliamentary assistance. The Dutch finance
minister recently visited Ulan Bator with promises of enhanced support.
In dealing with the United States, Mongolia was quick to offer support
for the US anti-terrorism campaign: political statements of condolence and
support, overflight of its western provinces for anti-terrorism related military
flights.  Mongolia’s management of its Muslim minority in the west also proves
instructive to those seeking a bridge to Islamic Asia.
Aside from its positive response on anti-terrorism, Mongolia has engaged
increasingly with the United States in its pursuit of trade and investment.  It is
also a resource on and contact with North Korea—a valuable asset for the US
and others concerned with DPRK developments.  Pyongyang and Ulan Bator
have a longstanding political relationship that has seen an uptick since a
Mongolian foreign ministry delegation visit in late September, a renewed
friendship treaty, reestablishment of DPRK representation to Ulan Bator (which
had gone into hiatus in 1999 out of economic concerns), the opening of a small
DPRK trade office in Ulan Bator, and an airlift of food aid from Mongolia to
North Korea after autumn 2001 floods in the DPRK’s eastern provinces.
Mongolia, which has enjoyed burgeoning political and economic relations
with South Korea this last decade, has also emerged as a key facilitator for
North Korean refugees making their way to the South.  US Korean American
aid groups working with DPRK refugees estimate that some 500 of the
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approximately 580 North Koreans who wound up in Seoul in 2001 transited
through Mongolia—a figure, if accurate, that is far higher than any previously
estimated by western governments.
Mongolia views itself as a potential mediator in Korean peninsular affairs,
especially given its good relations with both Pyongyang and Seoul and historic,
linguistic, and ethnic ties.  South Korean small business is on the rise in
Mongolia.  And Mongolia, with a decade of transitional experience from a
Stalinist system, may well have much to offer the peninsula.
North Korea
The DPRK for its part find itself in a difficult position, especially given
what it perceives as  US hardline policy and overt dislike by the US President
for North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, particularly relevant in the context of
Confucianism and the cult of Kim.  Pyongyang felt that it was drawing closer
to normalization with the Americans toward the end of the Clinton
administration, but were alarmed by the Bush policy review and its wake.  The
“axis address” and ensuing expressions of “disdain” eliminated room for
dialogue and ran the risk of cornering the regime in Pyongyang.
Filling the void for the US during its policy review was an active European
Union (EU), then under Swedish presidency.  Swedish PM Persson’s EU troika
visited Pyongyang in May 2001, historic in terms of western penetration and
given Kim Jong Il’s personal reception of the group.  The visit followed an
active two years of relations between North Korea and individual European
nations.  Italy had set normalization into play in early 2000, with 13 of 15 EU
nations following in its stead.  Kim Dae Jung’s Nobel addresses in Stockholm
and Oslo had called for greater engagement with the North, and the EU rose to
the occasion, spiriting efforts at a time when the DPRK’s slowdown with the
United States had cast a shadow on the South Korean President’s Sunshine
policy.  Although subsequent meetings between the EU and DPRK have seen
slow-going on human rights and missiles, the March 3-15, 2002 visit by a senior
DPRK economic delegation suggests interest in European economic models
and possibilities for further exchange and training.  Sweden, among other EU
nations, also provides a valuable setting for dialogue and other confidence-
building measures.
Recent concerns about DPRK nuclear ambitions are justified.  But the
DPRK also has expressed a willingness to entertain reform, although not by
that name, seemingly strengthened in the aftermath of Kim Jong Il’s visit to
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Shanghai, and exposure to EU economies, banking and other regulation
mechanisms, and information technology policy may register with pragmatists
in Pyongyang.  Although signs of any real economic progress are invisible, the
DPRK leadership has voiced enthusiasm for IT and sent a cross-sectional
representation in its recent visit that signalled a surprising breadth of DPRK
bureaucratic and party interest in the EU.
The importance of EU assistance rises given not only the DPRK’s stalled
relationship with the Americans, but the more conservative strain in Japan’s
relations with the North as well.  Japan halted its food aid to the North last year,
and ongoing concerns about Japanese kidnapped by the North in the 1970s, a
purging of the credit unions run by pro-DPRK Koreans in Japan, and the sinking
of a DPRK spy vessel by Japan in Chinese territorial waters speaks to the
downgrade in relations.  The DPRK ferry link was halted by North Korea in
June 2003.  The DPRK’s August 1998 missile test over Japan, in conjunction
with the kidnapping issue and visit of Japanese wives from North Korea to
Japan, constituted a watershed in shifting Japanese perceptions of the DPRK;
in years prior the Japanese public has expressed an ambivalent but somewhat
equidistant attitude toward the Koreas.  That public attitude toward the North
has transformed into fundamental distrust.  Recent political scandals and
resignations in Japan and the Prime Minister’s decline from ninety to fifty percent
popularity ratings suggest that the domestic mood in Tokyo will be even more
unforgiving with the DPRK, despite official reassurances to Seoul of its support
for South Korean President Roh’s approach.
Russia and China have upgraded relations with North Korea.  The DPRK’s
Kim Jong Il visited Russia for three weeks in summer 2001, demonstrating
both the North Korean leader’s consolidation of leadership (in feeling safe to
leave home for so long a time) and renewed interest in dealing with Moscow on
political, economic, and military matters.  Kim’s terminus was in St. Petersburg,
a window on Europe.  Kim’s visit followed two trips to China in as many years.
China’s Jiang Zemin in turn visited Pyongyang in September 2001, signalling
China’s continued interest and critical role on the peninsula.  Although the
levels of Russian and Chinese support for Pyongyang are unlikely to mirror
that in the Cold War, it is clear that both Moscow and Beijing have upgraded
relations with Pyongyang, in part as a point of leverage for their dealings with
the United States.
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New Security Architecture in Northeast Asia
Evident in Northeast Asia then are arrangements in flux, with Russia
reasserting itself eastward in both Mongolia and North Korea.  China is on the
rise—economically, politically, and in terms of its military capability.  Its
grappling with SARS suggested new demands and accountability on the part of
Beijing’s leadership.  Japan is seeking a more “normal” status, with its and
South Korea’s autonomous capabilities increasing.  Japan’s sinking of the DPRK
spy vessel was historic as the first demonstration of live fire since World War
II.  The United States remains forward deployed—the DPRK the underscored
raison d’etre—but questions will persist about the scope, impact, shape, and
longevity of US force presence; a decline in threat perceptions associated with
the DPRK would necessitate new justifications for US forward presence.  The
US is already describing anticipated pullbacks from the DMZ and force
restructuring and redeployment elsewhere.  Economic challenges abound
throughout the subregion, complicating political and security perceptions.  And
terrorism, environmental concerns, and energy security have emerged as non-
traditional priorities.
Nobel laureate Kim Dae Jung called for a new security architecture for
the peninsula and subregion.  Although the negative turn of attitudes in
Washington and Tokyo impeded his administration’s efforts with the DPRK,
that new architecture is emerging regardless and will continue under Roh, his
successor.  Economic and new security concerns will define the agendas among
states in Northeast Asia.
Consistent with Japanese track two calls for a “grand design,” or more
coordinated and synergistic approach toward subregional economic
development, a new Northeast Asian architecture need recognize the inherent
capabilities of all national actors and take advantage of burgeoning provincial
and local contacts among Northeast Asians.  Japanese and South Korean ODA
need combine with management and technology inputs, and the nations of the
“north,” such as Mongolia and North Korea should be recognized in terms of
both need and resources at hand.
In an area largely defined by strong bilateral relations the past half century,
the emerging architecture will have to avail itself of the multilateralism prevalent
since the mid-1990s and enhanced (despite fears of US unilateralism) since 9-
11.  The notion of community of nations gained special impetus with the tragic
events of September in that common threats and common concerns may be
remedied only by common solutions.
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How might the international community further then developments in the
region?  One is an upgrade in the recognition and strategic calculus of poorer
nations, such as Mongolia.  When one sees the 160 internet cafes on offer in
Ulan Bator or addresses Mongolia’s cosmopolitan and intellectually keen young
people, one sees a dynamism, a nation seeking to bridle the forces of
globalisation but at risk of being left behind without an international community
leg-up.  What is required is not only an upgrade in assistance but a political
commitment to applaud and reinforce positive developments in reforming
societies like Mongolia.
Similarly, the international community need recognize that the “last of
the Leninists”—North Korea—is at the core a strategically challenged and
impoverished nation.  The fine line is in softly encouraging positive reforms
where they might occur—through contacts by aid organizations at the local
and provincial levels, through sponsoring study and training missions that
fundamentally alter DPRK expectations and provide necessary exposure and
skills—while at the same time not rewarding “bad” behaviour—brinkmanship
or unreasonable demands.
In essence, the international community needs to reward and foster the
horsemen, not the hermits, and bring to the table those attempting to raise
standards of living at home.  For Mongolians, that viability lies too with exchange
and training opportunities abroad, reminding Mongolians that the difficult road
to transition is one that can be facilitated by the outside.  Similar efforts need
continue to occur with the North Koreans, but not at the expense of those nations
seemingly less relevant to the immediate strategic calculus.  Missiles and
weapons of mass destruction do warrant swift attention, but capabilities need
not be overstated and limitations should be recognized.  At the same time,
nations such as Mongolia, which declared itself a nuclear free zone, should be
applauded and lessons learned applied to the peninsula; this type of initiative
will gain in relevance as the peninsula moves toward integration and unification.
A Seoul connected to Ulan Bator by rail, a mere 20 hour journey, suggests
a fundamental economic transformation in Northeast Asia, one where energy
and natural resources will help feed Chinese, Korean, and Japanese demands,
and where Japanese and South Korean investment, management, and technology
can help remedy poverty in the “north.”  The natural economic territory suggests
tremendous opportunities for prosperity in the region.  That institutions and
new security architecture facilitate peace with prosperity is key; that the
horsemen of the “north” share in regional development is essential.
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